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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
vail over the less generous provisions for specific losses in Sec-
tion 8 (d) .28
V. INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
In the field of insurance, some interesting cases were before
the court during the 1948-1949 session.
The troublesome question of whether the defense of lack of
coverage is available despite an incontestability clause in the
policy and Act 140 of 19381 was up for decision in Gordon v. Unity
Life Insurance Company.2 The court ruled that the incontestabil-
ity clause in question did not operate to extend coverage to a risk
excluded under the policy and specifically excepted from the op-
eration of the clause, that is, death by venereal disease. It dis-
tinguished the earlier cases of Bernier v. Pacific Mutual Life In-
surance Company of California3 and Garrell v. Good Citizens Mu-
tual Benefit Association, Incorporated.4  Justice McCaleb filed
a persuasive concurring opinion in which he argued that the Gar-
rell case had incorrectly applied the Bernier case and that the
court should have taken advantage of the opportunity to correct
it. The basic holding that the incontestability clause and Act 140
of 1938 do not relate to risks excluded from coverage, unless an
ambiguity is created by the. wording of the policy, was concurred
in by the whole court.
Whether the insurer should have credited to certain insurance
policies dividends declared for the year 1942 and payable on poli-
cy anniversaries in 1943, "provided premiums shall have been
paid in full to such anniversaries and the policies are then in full
force" was the question in Oil Well Supply Company v. New
York Life Insurance Company.' By crediting the dividends, the
life of the policies would have been extended beyond the death
of insured.
The court found that the 1943 anniversary date of each poli-
cy was, in keeping with an election by the assured at the time of
28. This rule was conclusively established in Robichaux v. Realty Opera-
tors, 195 La. 70, 196 So. 23 (1940). See generally The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-Torts and Workmen's Compensation
(1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 248, 253 et seq.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4134.4.
2. 215 La. 25, 39 So.(2d) 812 (1949).
3. 173 La. 1078, 139 So. 629 (1932).
4. 204 La. 871, 16 So.(2d) 463 (1943).
5. 214 La. 772, 38 So.(2d) 777 (1949).
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application, June 30th. The evidence also showed that the quar-
terly premiums due on March 30, 1943, with respect to two of the
policies and on December 30, 1942, with respect to the other, had
not been paid. It was the contention of plaintiffs that it was
the duty of the company to credit the dividends declared for the
policy year 1942 to the policies which would have operated to
extend them beyond the date of insured's death, in April. The
company's position was that dividends were to be credited only
to those policies as to which premiums had been paid in full for
the policy year current on December 31, 1942, that is, for the
policy years ending June 30, 1943, and that since insured's poli-
cies had lapsed for non-payment of premium before such date,
therefore, under the terms of the resolution and Act 88 of 19066
the dividends were not payable and so could not extend the life
of the policies. The majority of the court agreed with this view
and rendered judgment for the defendant company dismissing
the suits. Justice Hamiter dissented, saying that the court had
failed to distinguish between the earning of a dividend, and the
payment thereof; that the dividends had been earned during the
year 1942 and while the policies were in full force and effect,
notwithstanding that they were not payable until June, 1943.
There is much to be said in favor of the view taken by Justice
Hamiter, yet the opinion of the majority was a literal application
of Act 88 of 1906 and the company's action based thereon. If
Justice Hamiter's view is the just one, the legislature may adopt
it by an appropriate amendment to the cited act.
Prior Louisiana cases have established the rule that the so-
called omnibus clause of an automobile liability policy covering
the use of the automobile "with the permission of the named in-
sured" covers its use in violation of authority given if there was
initial authority to use it on the occasion in question. The court,
but not without dissent, has now extended this rule to cover the
case where the vehicle is removed for an unauthorized purpose
from its place of storage on property belonging to the employer
by the one whose duty it was to store it there when the day's
work was done. Waits v. Indemnity Insurance Company of North
America." The protection of those injured by such operation may
be good public policy but the decision makes it increasingly
apparent that, when used by insurers, words may. have a very
uncommon and unusual signification.
6. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4104.
7. 215 La. 349, 40l So. (2d) 746 (1949).
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The question of when a planter or farm manager is totally
and permanently disabled within the meaning of an insurance
policy was presented to the court in Pearson v. Prudential In-
surance Company of America." It was found that the insured had
had an attack of coronary thrombosis which had left him in
such a condition that it was not safe for him to carry on his form-
er physically strenuous activities. It also appeared, however, that
insured was the owner of about 850 acres of land for the operation
of which he employed managers, assisted by his wife and brother.
The court followed the Boughton case9 in holding that if the dis-
ability is such that the insured is rendered unable to perform
the substantial and material acts of his business or occupation
in the usual and customary way, it is total and permanent.
In Stovall v. Empire States Insurance Company1 ° the court
found no reason for holding a fire policy void on the ground that
the insured had withheld material facts where all the facts were
either known to the agent or subject to discovery on inquiry prior
to the loss. It also held that the plaintiff had not lost his insurable
interest in the property by forming a corporation to which he
had never transferred it.
VI. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
A. CRIMINAL LAW
Definition of Crimes-Certainty Required
General language, as distinguished from detailed specifica-
tion and enumeration, may be used in defining crimes-provided
the words employed are of definite well-understood application.
For example, "reasonable care" to avoid injuring others traveling
upon the streets was held by the Maryland court to constitute a
"flexible but reasonably certain" standard of conduct.' In the
8. 214 La. 220, 36 So.(2d) 763 (1948).
9. Boughton v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 183 La. 908, 165 So. 140
(1936).
10. 215 La. 100, 39 So.(2d) 837 (1949).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. State v. Magaha, 182 Md. 122, 129-130, 32 Atl. (2d) 477, 480-481 (1943). In
this case Judge Delaplaine epitomized the policy underlining his and many
other similar decisions when he declared "It is desirable, of course, that penal
statutes and ordinances should be expressed in language as specific as the
subject matter will permit, but it is obviously impossible to define some types
of crime by a detailed description of all possible cases that may arise. The
prohibited act may be characterized by a general term without definition, if
the term has a settled common-law meaning and a commonly understood
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